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THE INVENTOR'S DILEMMA:
THE RIGHT TO COPY v. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
WILIAm J. KeATING t
W HILE imitation may be the sincerest form of flat-
tery, in the market place it represents the most in-
vidious form of competition. It is the purpose of this article
to compare the right of -the innovator with the right of the
copier.
The inventor, designer and author all receive the hom-
age of a society grateful for the contribution which im-
proves the standard of living, or otherwise renders life
more enjoyable. However, the copier, imitator or literary
thief receives the financial rewards. The copier does not
encounter the engineering expenses incurred through abor-
tive failures experienced and paid for by the discoverer.
He does not have the expense of product design, nor does
he bear the expense of preparing the market for product
acceptance. He appears on the scene only after the prod-
uct has been given public approval. Since he does not bear
any of these costs, he can manufacture for less and sell for
less. The purchasing public buys on impulse and part of
the impulse is the incentive of a lower price.
It is not suggested that the purchasing public reward
the inventor by buying the more expensive article, since
usually the public does not know which product is the
original and which is the copy. However, there has been
a gradual erosion of proprietary rights in industrial prop-
erty which reached a climax in a coup de grace adminis-
tered by the Supreme -Court in two recent companion cases.
t B.S., Canisius College; LL.B., Georgetown University School of Law;
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INVENTOR'S DILEMMA
In Stiffel v. Sears, Roebuek & Co.,' the plaintiff, Stiffel,
designed and marketed a "pole light" consisting of a
telescoping rod having lamp fixtures secured to, the rod.
The rod was adapted to be mounted between the floor
and the ceiling so that the lights were set at various
heights. The plaintiff's device was not eligible to receive
a valid patent in the United States, since pole lamps
were not basically new. Stiffel had sold three and one-
quarter million dollars worth of these lamps from 1956
to 1960. Sears was attracted to the market and began
selling lamps of this type at a retail price which was the
equivalent of Stiffel's wholesale price.'
The district court held that the defendant was guilty
of unfair competition and the circuit court of appeals
affirmed. The latter court's comparison of defendant's
product with that of the plaintiff illustrated their re-
markable similarity in appearance. The court also noted
there was evidence of customer confusion as to the source
of defendant's lamp.'
Seaxs argued unsuccessfully in the circuit court of
appeals that plaintiff's proofs failed to establish "secondary
meaning" 4 or "palming off"' under the law of the State
of Illinois. The court held that it was not necessary to
prove "actual confusion" but merely a "likelihood of
confusion," ' 6 citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco
Corp.7
IStiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2 Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir.
1963).
3 Ibid.
4 "Secondary meaning" in trademark law refers to public acceptance
of a trademark. It usually refers to words having an ordinary English
definition or "first meaning," that have been used as a trademark on goods
which have achieved sufficient popularity whereby the "second meaning"
of the word is to define goods made by that manufacturer.
5 "Palming off" refers to a misrepresentation by a second merchant
that his goods are from the same source as the goods offered by the
trademark proprietor.
6Supra note 2.
7 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
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Con.pco was based on a similar fact situation. The
plaintiff designed, manufactured and marketed reflectors
for commercial fluorescent lights. The plaintiff's design
was ineligible for a valid United States patent. However,
the plaintiff charged the defendant with unfair competi-
tion in marketing devices having an appearance which
was confusingly similar to the plaintiff's product. The
district court again ruled for the plaintiff, and the circuit
court of appeals affirmed.' The district court did not
specifically find "secondary meaning," but it did find that
the appearance of plaintiff's devices had the "capacity to
identify the plaintiff in the trade and does, in fact, so
identify the plaintiff to the trade."'
The defendant unsuccessfully urged that a charge of
unfair competition required a showing of fraud and since
the plaintiff had not proved fraud, the defendant was
entitled to prevail. The circuit court dismissed this
argument 0 by quoting from Independent Nail d Packing
Co. v. Stronghold Screw Prods., Inc.:"11 "'The test should
be whether the public is likely to be deceived,' 12 and
by further quoting from G. Leblanc Corp. v. H. d- A.
Selmer, Inc. :"
"'[I]n all cases of unfair competition, it is the [sic] principles
of old fashioned honesty which are controlling.' " 14
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
both cases, 5 and simultaneously handed down companion
decisions reversing the circuit court of appeals."
The Supreme Court, while not repealing the principles
of old-fashioned honesty, greatly encouraged those who
8 Ibid.
9Id. at 29.
1o Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
"1205 F2d 921 (7th Cir. 1953).
12Id. at 926. (Emphasis added.)
13310 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1962).
"1 Id. at 460.
Is Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 374 U.S. 825 (1963);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 374 U.S. 826 (1963).
16 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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would ignore them. With a shocking lack of preciseness,
if not bad law, the Court stated that if the article is
unpatented or uncopyrighted, the state may not prohibit
the copying of the article. 7
The decision pointedly ignores the Lanham Act, which
defines the nature of a trademark as: "[A] mark may
consist of any trade-mark, symbol, label, package, configura-
tion of goods. .. ." 11
Statutes similar to the Lanham Act have been adopted
by many states, including Illinois." Trademark law is
of dual authority with the federal government controlling
trademarks on goods moving interstate, and the local state
government controlling trademarks on goods moving in-
trastate.
Under federal law, Stiffel was entitled to a trademark
registration covering the configuration of the goods, as was
Day-Brite. Under Illinois statutes, they were also entitled
to register the configuration of the goods they sold as their
trademark. Apparently what the Supreme Court found
was that the states had no authority to grant common-
law rights in protection of configurations of goods. Under
the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tontpkibts, no federal
common-law right existed.
The Supreme Court also feared that, under the guise
of trademark protection, the states would give exclusive
design rights to manufacturers who were unable to obtain
patent protection. A patent grant lasts for seventeen years
and may not be renewed except by an act of Congress."
A trademark registration is perpetual as long as the trade-
mark proprietor continues to use the mark on the goods
as a means of identifying the source.2 Obviously, a mer-
chant, having an option, would prefer to receive trademark
protection in preference to patent protection.
17 Sears, id. at 232-33; Compco, id. at 237.
"876 Stat. 773 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
19ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, §§ 8-27 (Smith-Hurd 1955).
20304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21 79 Stat. 261 (1965), 35 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. 1966).
2276 Stat. 770 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (1964).
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The classical trademark, e.g, the word or symbol,
presents no problem because it is not subject to patent
protection. However, a manufacturer who designs and
markets a new product has the option of applying for
patent protection on the design of the new product, or
alternatively taking the position that the shape (or con-
figuration) of the goods is his trademark. To establish
trademark rights, however, the trademark proprietor must
show that the purchasing public recognizes the configura-
tion of the goods and identifies him as the source of such
goods, i.e, secondary meaning.
The question arises as to whether or not the merchant
may issue a patent on the design, and subsequently register
it as his trademark. By coincidence, three days after the
Supreme Court's decision, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals handed down a decision in the case of
In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,23 affirmatively holding
that an applicant was entitled to a design patent covering
the fanciful shape of a wine bottle, as well as a trademark
registration denominating the shape of the bottle as in-
dicating the source of the goods. The court reasoned that
the trademark right and the patent right were unrelated
and neither one enlarged or diminished the other. Further-
more, nothing in either the patent statute or the trademark
statute prohibited this.
. Judge Rich, concurring,24 distinguished a trademark
registration covering the package containing the goods from
the eonflguratiovn of the goods themselves. He reasoned
that the package containing the goods was registrable if it
performed a trademark function. With regard to the
configuration of the goods themselves, he further distin-
guished between situations wherein the shape of the goods
was purely arbitrary and situations wherein the shape
of the goods contributed some utilitarian function to the
use or enjoyment of the goods. He felt the configuration
of goods, based on ornamental consideration, was regis-
2351 G.C.P.A. 1260, 328 F.2d 925 (1964).
2-4 Id. at 1269, 328 F.2d at 932.
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trable as a trademark, assuming it identified the source
of goods to the purchasing public.
However, he went on to state that any configuration
of goods dictated by the use or construction of the goods
(what he termed an "engineering" function) was not
registrable as a trademark. The judge also indicated that
granting such a registration would give the applicant a
perpetual monopoly on a functional design. Such protec-
tion comes only within the purview of the patent statutes,
and then only for a limited period of time, as noted
above.25
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's rulings, a pleth-
ora of cases were decided by various tribunals interpreting
these decisions. The earliest case arose on a motion for
summary judgment in Duplex Strawv Dispenser Co. v.
Harold Leonard & Co.,2 6 on a set of facts virtually identical
to the Sear6lCoinpco cases. The plaintiff's design patent
was held invalid. On the issue of unfair competition,
Judge Crary was moved to remark:
Although copying a device may prompt the cry of 'foul' where
the originator has not protected the device with a valid patent, the
copying thereof is not prohibited by law . . 27
and quoted copiously from the Supreme Court's decisions.
At approximately the same time, the New York
Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine in a case
involving misleading advertising. In Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. Em enee Industries Inc.,28 the defendant used reproduc-
tions of the plaintiff's bongo drums in its advertising in
order to sell competing drums. The court held that this
constituted a commercial practice condemned in law, and
nothing in the United States Supreme Court's decisions
sanctioned it or limited the State of New York's right
to declare it unlawful.
25 For the final disposition of this case, see In re Mogen David Wine
Corp., 152 U.S.P.Q. 593 (1967).
26229 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cal. 1964).
27 Ibid.
28 141 U.S.P.Q. 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1964).
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The Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to apply
the doctrine of the Sears/Compeo cases in Edgar H. Wood
Associates, Ine. v. ,Skene.29  The plaintiff had designed an
apartment building and filed plans with the local building
authority. Defendants obtained access to the plans and
intended to construct similar buildings according to these
plans. The court ruled for the plaintiff, and distinguished
the Sears/Co.pco cases on the grounds that nothing
in these cases forbids the states from protecting common-
law copyrights. A similar result was reached by the
New York Supreme Court in the case of Flamingo Telefilm
Sales v. United Artists Corp." The court held that the
Sears/Compco decisions did not abolish the right of the
states to enforce common-law copyrights.
Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit (wherein the Sears/Compco cases origi-
nated) had occasion to review the district court's finding,
in the light of the Supreme Court's decisions, in the case
of Aerosol Research Co. v. Scovill Mfg. Co." The patent
was held valid by the district court and defendant was
found guilty of unfair competition for copying plaintiff's
patented device (aerosol valves). The court of appeals
affirmed the holding of patent infringement but reversed
on the question of unfair competition under the doctrine
of the Sears/Compco cases. The appellate court also re-
versed the district court's award of treble damages and
attorneys' fees, and restricted the scope of the injunction
to the matter claimed by the patent.
The World's Fair was drawn into the controversy in
the case of New York World's Fair 1964-65 Corp. v. Colour-
picture Publishers, lic." The defendant, Colourpicture
Publishers, attempted to obtain permission from exhibitors
at the fair to use reproductions of their exhibits on post-
cards, albums, etc. The plaintiff, New York World's Fair
1964-65 Corporation, filed suit and the New York Supreme
29 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886 (1964).
30 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
31334 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1964).
3221 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1964).
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Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on a motion for pre-
liminary injunction. The Court held that the Sears/Compco
doctrine did not strike down all state regulations on unfair
competition. The rationale was that the Fair would run
only two years, and thus was not subject to the "perpetual
monopoly" danger referred to by the Supreme Court.
It was also the court's opinion that the defendant inter-
fered with plaintiff's business rights. This ruling was
affirmed by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, in a three-to-two decision.3
The New York Supreme Court applied the Sears/
Comnpco doctrine in discussing a complaint for unfair
competition brought by the designer of mannequins against
a copier, Wolf & Vine v. Pioneer Display Fixture,4 and
refused to grant the plaintiff relief.
A number of federal courts have applied the doctrine
in cases decided since the Supreme Court's rulings and
refused to apply it in others. The District Court for the
Southern District of California, in the case of Jerrold
Stephens Co. v. Alladin. Plastics," granted partial sum-
mary judgment on a set of facts that were identical
with the Sears/Com pco decisions. The plaintiff sued for
declaratory judgment of invalidity of defendant's design
patent relating to bucket seats. The defendant counter-
claimed for patent infringement and unfair competition.
The court held the design patent invalid for lack of in-
vention. Applying the doctrine of the SearlsCuompco cases,
it went on to hold, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff
was entitled to copy defendant's product.
The District Court for the Eastern District of New
York was requested to consider the doctrine in a motion
for preliminary injunction. The case of International
Biotical Corp. v. Federated Department Stores "6 involved
infringement of a design patent on a combined massager
and infra-red heat lamp. Traditionally, a preliminary in-
33 Ibid.
34 142 U.S.P.Q. 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
35229 F. Supp. 536 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
36229 F. Supp. 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
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junction will not be granted in a patent infringement case
unless the patent is valid beyond all doubt." The plaintiff
argued that in view of the Supreme Court's action (i.e.,
reducing the basis for granting relief for acts of unfair
competition), the court should extend the scope of the
protection by granting a preliminary injunction in cases
of this type. The court refused to grant the injunction
and rejected the plaintiff's novel argument by stating that
if the rule is to be discarded, the decision to do so must
emanate from the Court of Appeals.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri was called upon to apply the Sears/Compco doctrine
in the case of Kingsiway, Iiw. v. Werner.38 The plaintiff
manufactured and sold chessmen of a "Florentine" design.
The plaintiff charged the defendant with unfair competition
because of its acts of copying and simulating the design
of chessmen sold by plaintiff. The -court interpreted the
Supreme Court's decisions as affirming prior law, that
copying a competitor's product constituted unfair competi-
tion only if the product had acquired secondary meaning.
Accordingly, the court held for the defendant.
In the case of Piel Mfg. Co. v. George A. Rolfes Co.,"
the court went so far as to indicate that products achieving
secondary meaning might no longer be protectable4 °
In Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Go.,
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
again considered the matter as applied to lollipops. The
plaintiff sold confections of this type under the trademark
"Dum-Dums," and the defendant sold identical goods under
the trademark "Pop-Pops." The plaintiff charged the
defendant with unfair competition, alleging the defendant's
packaging format was virtually identical with that of
the plaintiff. The Illinois court, apparently chastened by
37Zandelin v. Maxwell Bentley Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
38233 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
39233 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Iowa 1964).
4old. at 897.
41235 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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the Supreme Court's reversal of its decisions in the Sears/
Cornpco cases, read the Supreme Court's decision as doing
away with state common-law rights, while leaving un-
affected state statutory rights.2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applied the Sears/Compco doctrine in a case un-
related to trademarks. 3  The defendant was an Idaho
television station having contractual rights in the Idaho
area for all first-run network television programs. Plain-
tiffs built a community antenna and received, from more
distant stations, the identical programs broadcast by the
defendants and re-broadcast them for profit at the same
time as defendant's programs. The plaintiffs sued for
violation of the antitrust laws, and defendants counter-
claimed for unfair competition. The district court ruled
(prior to the Sears/Conpeo cases) in favor of the de-
fendants, and awarded an injunction on the basis of a
common-law right of freedom from contractual inter-
ference.
The court of appeals decision was rendered after the
Sears/Cornpco cases. It reversed the district court in
view of the language in the Sears/Conpco cases, holding
that the defendants had no common-law right to prevent
copying by the plaintiffs, and defendants could not generate
such a right by contract with a third party.
This is one of the few cases where a court has applied
the SearslCoinpco doctrine to literary property (i.e., plays,
books, movies, etc.). It would seem the doctrine is more
applicable to cases involving consumer goods, and less
applicable to cases involving literary property.
'Where some previous contractual relationship existed
between the plaintiff and defendant, the courts will hold
the defendant to a more strict standard of conduct than
might otherwise apply. In Flexitized, Inc. v. National
Flexitized Corp.," defendants had contracted with the
plaintiffs to sell plaintiffs' collar stays and use the plain-
tiffs' trademark. The collar stays were unpatented; de-
42 Id. at 29-30.
43 Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
44335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965).
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fendants breached the agreement and sold competitive collar
stays in competition with the plaintiffs under the trade-
mark 1FLEXITIZED." The court distinguished the Sears/
Cornpco cases and ruled for the plaintiffs, in spite of the
finding that plaintiffs' product had not developed any
"secondary meaning" and a finding that the term "FLEX-
ITIZED" was merely descriptive of the product despite a
finding there was no "palming off."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit also refused to apply the Sears/Compco doctrine
in a case involving a breach of a confidential relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant.45 Again, the case in-
volved invalid patents, in this instance directed to railroad
"hot box detectors." The plaintiff disclosed all its en-
gineering data to defendant, permitted the defendant to
inspect the devices and copy its engineering drawings, and
installed experimental devices for the defendant. The
court held that, in spite of the fact that the patents were
invalid, the defendant was guilty of unjust enrichment
through breach of confidential relationship, and the court's
authority to grant a remedy is derived from its power'to
award general equitable relief.
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, in Electric
Storage Battery Co. v. Mine Safety Appliances Go., , inter-
preted the Supreme Court's rulings to mean that a three-
dimensional configuration of goods was registrable as a
trademark if the elements of the configuration did not
serve a utilitarian purpose.
The District Court for the Western District of Ken-
tucky distinguished between copying the product and
copying the trade dress. While recognizing copying an
unpatented product was permissible under the Sears/
Compco doctrine, they went on to hold that a spiral spot
pattern on a sash cord was a distinctive trade dress which
identified the source of the goods and, therefore, granted
the plaintiff injunctive relief."
45 Servo Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964).
46 143 U.S.P.Q. 163, 54 Trademark Rep. 995 (1964).




A motion to dismiss a complaint charging patent in-
fringement and unfair competition was denied by the
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
on the theory that the patents might be held valid and,
therefore, the state could institute prohibitions against
copying an article which was the subject of a valid United
States patent."8 The same court refused to rule, as a
matter of law, that the SearsCompco doctrine permitted
defendants to publish "Tarzan" stories which were not
wiritten by Edgar Rice Burroughs."
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
refused to dismiss a complaint for copying, in view of
allegations in the complaint, charging that the defendant
is engaged in actual misrepresentation which was facili-
tated by the copying of plaintiff's product.5 9
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed
the lower court's award of damages and injunction to an
employer whose former employee went into competition
selling elevator lubricators, patterned from and similar
in appearance to the plaintiff's devices. The prior fidu-
ciary relationship was insufficient to take the case out of
the Sears/Compco doctrine."
The Tappan Company sued General Motors Corpora-
tion in the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, wherein plaintiff alleged infringement of a design
patent on kitchen ranges, and unfair competition for selling
ranges which were identical to those of the plaintiff except
for the labeling. The court granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the unfair competition count, holding
that it did not state a cause of action.2
The District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania remanded a case, involving a radio station's
4 Parker Metal Goods Co. v. R.M.S. Electronics, Inc., 243 F. Supp.
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
4 Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Charlton Publications, Inc., 243 F.
Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
50AM CO Engineering v. Bud Radio Inc., 145 U.S.P.Q. 609 (1965).5 Angell Elevator Lock Co. v. Manning, 348 Mass. 623, 205 N.E.2d 245
(1965).52 Tappan Co. v. General Motors Corp., 248 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
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appropriating news from a newspaper, to the state court
holding the Sears/Comwpco doctrine did not preclude an
action, based upon a state unfair-competition law, for an
invasion of a property right in uncopyrighted news. 3
A trademark case, wherein the marks were identical
but the goods dissimilar, held that the Sears/ompco doc-
trine prohibited injunctions in cases where the defendant had
only pirated the "good will" of the trademark proprietor.
The defendant was selling "Haig & Haig" pinch-bottle
bubble bath in spite of plaintiff's rights in "Haig & Haig"
pinch-bottle scotch whiskey. 4
The District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied relief on a complaint charging unfair com-
petition by reason of defendants' imitation of plaintiff's
hair curlers, alleging that defendants copied plaintiff's
color scheme, packaging, dress of goods, etc. The court
held that plaintiff had not shown "secondary meaning,"
and in any event was precluded from basing any part of
its claim upon similarity of the goods themselves, citing
SearslCorpco.5
CONcLUSION
The Supreme Court has ruled that the states do not
have a common-law right to preclude competitive copying
of consumer goods. The federal patent statute has pre-
empted the field although the states are still free to enact
statutes to prevent deception of the public. The lower
courts, which have considered the question since the Sears/
Compco cases were handed down, will follow the decisions
only in fact situations which are nearly identical with
the fact situations in the Sears/Compco cases. However,
where fact situations differ, the courts tend to distinguish
these cases and reapply the old-fashioned principles of
honesty.
53 Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co.,
247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965).54 Haig & Haig v. Maradel Products, 249 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
55 Delamere v. Taylor-Bell, 249 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
[ VOL. 42
